to emphasize individual sanctions, and to coordinate the imposition of adverse consequences to help achieve optimal deterrence.
II SELECTED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ISSUES
Several issues stand out as particularly relevant when approaching the issue from the perspective of a recent antitrust and consumer protection enforcer.
A. Individual Liability
To address concerns about the wrongdoing of corporations, 1 should individuals, corporations, or both be sanctioned? Judge Richard Posner was an early voice for penalizing only the corporation. He argued that a corporation "has effective methods of preventing its employees from committing acts that impose huge liabilities on it." 2 More recently, the individual-liability side of the debate has gained popularity. Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, in particular, have argued persuasively that the state can punish an individual more severely than a firm can, and that relying on firms to punish individuals may result in insufficient incentives to avoid wrongdoing.
B. Entity Liability
Although one could ask whether entity liability is necessary, given sufficient individual liability, fairly convincing cases have been made for some form of entity sanctions. Law professors Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman have canvassed a variety of reasons: Individuals may be judgment-proof, identifying and sanctioning individuals may be more costly for the state than the firm, and entities may not respond sufficiently to individual liability. 4 Law and economics professor Thomas S. Ulen has further argued that corporations are not only in a good position to encourage employees to obey legal commands, but would face a perverse incentive to encourage law-breaking if they were not subject to the risk of vicarious liability. 5 1. The term "corporations" is a term of convenience. Little would turn on whether an entity is a corporation, a partnership, or a limited liability company.
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 226 (1976 port the wrong. 10 Some commentators have objected to the entire carrot approach. 11 Others have fretted that the corporate compliance programs contemplated by the Guidelines will be ineffective unless the fruits of self-inspection are immunized or good conduct is otherwise rewarded. 12 Arlen and Kraakman argue that a composite of strict liability and duty-based liability is the ideal way to deter corporate wrongdoing and provide incentives for monitoring, investigating, and reporting violations. 13 
III DETERRENCE BY THE ANTITRUST DIVISION AND THE FTC
Stepping back from such global issues and considering the penalties sought and imposed by the Antitrust Division and the FTC, two observations leap out. First, penalties for what might be termed "hard core" violations of laws enforced by those agencies have risen substantially. Second, and in part as a result of this, the agencies employ a strikingly discontinuous set of penalties.
A. Increase in Penalties
Antitrust has seen a remarkable increase in authorized penalties. What was once a wrist-slap, or a ticket to be paid while continuing to err, is now a potentially substantial penalty. Consider the increase in possible penalties for hardcore price fixing:
10. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f), (g) (1991) (amended 1995). An "effective" compliance program is one that "has been reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct," id. § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k), although the concept of an effective yet unsuccessful compliance program seems a tad anomalous.
11. See, e.g., Block, supra note 7, at 407 (objecting to what he saw as a move to a negligence standard that would result in inefficiently low industry-wide penalties (and prices) by mitigating penalties when precautions were taken,); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., "Carrot and Stick" Sentencing: Structuring Incentives for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 126 (1990) 445 (1981) (arguing that "due diligence" should be a "sentencing consideration" but not a "defense"; also calling for creative use of probation).
13. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 4. Chancellor Allen's opinion in In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) , provided an additional, and potentially powerful, incentive for monitoring when, relying in part on the Sentencing Guidelines, he concluded that "a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards." Id. at 970. 1890: Sherman Act was passed. Violation is a misdemeanor, subject to up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine for individuals and corporations. 14 1955: Maximum fine for violating the Sherman Act was increased to $50,000.
1974: Violations became felonies; maximum incarceration time increased from one year to three years; maximum fine raised from $50,000 to $100,000 (individuals) and $1 million (corporations). 15 1977: Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines said the "base period" recommended sentence for a Sherman Act conviction will be eighteen months. 16 1984: Fine for individuals raised to $250,000, and, for entities and individuals, the fine may be the greatest of that figure or twice the defendant's gross gain or victims' loss. 1990: The maximum fine was increased to $10 million for entities and $350,000 for individuals.
1991: Corporate sentencing guidelines take effect, further increasing potential fines. 20 1998: The Division is expected to ask Congress to increase the maximum corporate fine from $10 million to $100 million. 21 Average imposed corporate fines jumped in 1977 and again in 1990, rose thereafter, and soared in 1997. (1994) (reauthorizing this potentially significant alternative maximum fine). The Division has relied on this authorization nine times to achieve fines of greater than $10 million. See Gary R. Spratling, Remarks Before the National Institute on White Collar Crime(Mar. 6, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1583.htm>).
18. 18 U.S.C. § § 3551-86 (1994 Although the FTC has no criminal authority with which to contrast its general lack of civil antitrust sanctions, its consumer fraud program seeks and obtains sanctions almost as draconian as criminal penalties against parties who have engaged in near-criminal (if not criminal) wrongdoing. This program, which came to dominate FTC consumer protection efforts during the 1980s, 27 continues to be a mainstay of FTC enforcement activity. In recent years, the FTC has allied itself with the state attorneys general and other federal enforcers in coordinated attacks that impose serious consequences on perpetrators of consumer fraud. 28 As part of its fraud program, the FTC regularly seeks and obtains from federal courts orders banning individuals from specific fields of endeavor (typically telemarketing) or requiring that they post a bond before engaging in such an activity. 29 Given the records of many of these individuals, a requirement to post a bond is often functionally equivalent to banning them from the activity altogether. While not prison, a lifetime sentence to refrain from one's chosen way of making a living is a remarkably severe (if perhaps well-deserved) consequence.
30
The FTC has also won orders requiring defendants to pay quite massive sums to specified persons and the U.S. treasury. For instance, in November of 1997, the FTC announced a $2.74 million "consumer redress" settlement for the benefit of 38,000 consumers injured in an internet scam. 31 Although not styled as "fines" or "penalties," these "consumer redress" 32 payments extract cash, sometimes for the benefit of the Treasury, just as effectively as any penalty. 32. The FTC has only gradually assumed its role as a major collector of consumer redress. In 1971, the FTC issued an opinion that reversed the hearing examiner's initial decision and concluded that the agency could order restitution either to restore "the competitive status quo" or because the respondent's holding of ill-gotten gains "was an unfair trade practice in and of itself." Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1516 (1971) (dismissing complaint on other grounds). The FTC observed that, with respect to the statutory authorization to issue "cease and desist" orders, "[i]t has been generally recognized that the remedial powers thus conferred are far broader and more flexible than a literal reading of the statutory language would indicate." Id. at 1512 (footnote omitted). When an unfortunate Ninth Circuit opinion held that the FTC's section 5 authority did not extend to ordering refunds of wrongly obtained moneys, Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974), the FTC elected not to seek certiorari, but rather to rely on new authority granted it by Congress in section 19 of the FTC Act.
Section 19 authorizes the FTC to seek and courts to grant "such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury" from violations of trade regulation rules. Id. Also, when an FTC adjudicative proceeding has determined that a respondent committed an "unfair or deceptive act or practice," the FTC may win such relief in court if it "satisfies the court" that "a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances" that the act or practice "was dishonest or fraudulent." Id. The FTC has used this authority to win consumer redress in a couple of litigated proceedings and many administrative consent orders. See, e.g., FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasonable person would have known it was "dishonest or fraudulent" to mislead consumers into believing that heat detectors were superior to smoke detectors, so consumer redress-but not other disgorgement-was justified under section 19 of the FTC Act).
Although, absent consent, section 19 authority can be used only in federal court after a full administrative trial, the FTC cautiously developed an alternative basis for obtaining court-ordered consumer More dramatic still, the FTC seeks many of these remedies through ex parte proceedings in which judicial asset freezes are successfully sought. 34 The fear A month later, the Ninth Circuit set forth a similar view and explicitly held that section 13(b) authorized courts to freeze assets. See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) ("We hold that Congress, when it gave the district court authority to grant a permanent injunction against violations of any provisions of law enforced by the FTC, also gave the district court authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable power explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.").
Since the early 1980s, the district courts and the courts of appeal have consistently interpreted section 13(b) to permit courts to rely on their traditional equitable powers to "order any ancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the exercise of the granted powers. lower court's conclusion that it "has the inherent power of a court of equity to grant ancillary relief, including freezing assets and ap-that justifies such relief is that otherwise the malfeasors will squirrel assets away, safe from the arm of the law. The coincident by-product of such orders, however, is that the defendants may have little stomach for defending a lawsuit (or, if they have stomach, few assets). 35 Time and again, the FTC wins relief against little opposition. sanction for most other violations of the Sherman Act and the FTC Act striking. The most egregious example of anti-competitive predation, the most aggressively offensive group boycott, the most transparently illegal mergerassuming they did not cross the line to criminality-would each likely result in, at most, a prospective, nonpunitive order.
37 This is less a problem with mergers, because most major mergers are reported to the antitrust agencies under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 38 which Congress passed in order to give the agencies an opportunity to enjoin problematic mergers. Where a merger is not reported, either through non-compliance or because the merger is not subject to a reporting requirement, the agencies are left after the fact to try to prevent continuing harm, with time working in the prospective defendant's favor. 39 Federal antitrust enforcement is largely an all-or-nothing world of extreme penalties or no punishment at all.
If nothing else, it seems odd for two agencies to have such a bi-modal approach to punishing. Were one coming at the issue afresh, one would expect to see a graduated series of sanctions.
As it stands now, the system's extreme divergence in consequences has costs. For instance, the agencies may stretch to fit questioned activity within the category of activities for which there are serious sanctions in order that a punishment will be imposed. Where there are very serious sanctions, however, courts are (quite properly) hesitant to find violations. 40 (1978) . In a current example of Division line-drawing, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein explained that the Division did not proceed criminally against a horizontal arrangement affecting price in NASDAQ because the arrangement was "really an industry practice" that was followed only "as a matter of custom," which made the agreement "thin. sufficiently clear to justify serious penalty.) If an enforcement agency, without the alternative of a modest penalty, has tried to justify a high penalty, cases may be lost that perhaps should have been won.
For instance, one wonders whether the Antitrust Division would have brought that troubled case against General Electric if it could have pursued some punishment short of criminal conviction. 41 Similarly, in 1990 the Antitrust Division fired a shot across the bow of all professionals considering fixing prices when it indicted a group of Tuscon, Arizona, dentists.
42 That shot rebounded back against the Division when the trial judge acquitted two dentists and granted the third a new trial. 43 Although the Ninth Circuit vacated the acquittals, the Court expressed grave discomfort at the prospect of punishing dentists' practice-related conduct with criminal convictions, 44 and the Division settled the cases. 45 Assistant Attorney General Klein has noted that, if nothing else, the Ninth Circuit doubted the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 46 The Division many not have felt compelled to take such a dramatic step if a lesser but still punitive option were available.
Pushing questionable cases into the high-sanctions category surely results in some firms being penalized more severely than they ought to be. One hopes that enforcement agencies will never bring unfounded suits, but error is human, so the best of agencies surely make mistakes. Although many prosecutorial errors are corrected in litigation, many cases are not litigated, but rather are set-41. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1994). In General Electric, the Division sought to prove a criminal price-fixing conspiracy despite the absence (for lack of jurisdiction) of three of the four named defendants and many potential witnesses. In the end, the Court viewed the case as an "information exchange case" that should be subject to the rule of reason, rather than a per se price-fixing conspiracy where criminal culpability had been shown. 44. See United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d at 1214: Finally, we are told that this is the first criminal antitrust prosecution of health care professionals in half a century. See Brief for the ADA and the AMA as Amici Curiae at 4. While it is not our place to question the government's motives in elevating to the criminal level a dispute normally handled as a civil enforcement matter, the crushing consequences of a criminal conviction on the lives and careers of the defendants singled out for such treatment makes it all the more important that the district judge spell out with specificity what the jury must find in order to convict. 45. See United States v. Alston, No. CR-90-042-TUC (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 1993). Charges against the three dentists and one professional corporation were dismissed with prejudice. One sole-shareholder professional corporation entered a no contest plea and agreed to pay $5,000 and perform 250 hours of community service.
46. See Klein, supra note 36.
tled (or not contested), resulting in cases in which overly severe remedies are imposed.
47
Finally, but most obviously, the limitation of penalties to very selected cases may result in insufficient deterrence. To be sure, the antitrust agency agenda is not limited to deterrence; in particular, modern merger review is a largely regulatory process designed to isolate and excise offending aspects of otherwise benign or pro-competitive mergers. At times, however, the antitrust agencies enforce rules that are reasonably clear and intended to prevent harmful conduct, yet relatively ineffectual because enforcement is unaccompanied by penalties. The likelihood of suboptimal deterrence is discussed below.
IV REFLECTIONS ON CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND ANTITRUST AGENCY PENALIZING PRACTICES
Some leading current corporate-compliance issues were reviewed above in Part II. Having now considered the structure of deterrence at the Antitrust Division and the FTC, I reflect on these issues-individual liability, entity liability, criminal liability, and carrots-in light of the experience of the antitrust agencies.
A. Individual Liability Government antitrust officials hold individuals responsible for criminal wrongdoing, but for little else. With a few exceptions, in each of the past seventeen fiscal years, the Division has won indictments against almost as many individuals as corporations: 48 47. The lack of intermediate sanctions may impose costs even for cases brought under civil authority. One worries about whether the all-too-human temptation to seek to punish someone who has done wrong does not manifest itself in order provisions that may be designed, if only subconsciously, to impose costs. Thus, for many years the FTC had a policy of insisting on an order if a firm litigated a merger-even if the firm abandoned the merger before the appeals process was exhausted. This led to the discomforting spectacle of the FTC expending massive resources to adjudicate a challenge to a long-abandoned merger by Coca-Cola, all because Coca-Cola would not agree to an order. One has to guess (and for me it is only a guess) that each side thought the other utterly unreasonable: Coke because the FTC sought an order of little practical significance, the FTC because Coke wouldn't agree to that same order. In 1995, the FTC abandoned its policy of routinely requiring prior approval clauses in orders resolving litigated but abandoned mergers. Yet the Division very rarely names individuals as defendants in civil suits. In calendar years 1995 through 1997, for instance, excluding actions alleging failure to report mergers, the Division did not file a single civil action against an individual.
49
The FTC brings only civil cases and, like the Division's apparent civil-case policy, names relatively few individuals in competition complaints. Of 115 merger final consent orders, from fiscal year 1990 through October 31, 1997, only three named individuals. 50 Of 102 non-merger final consent orders during the same time period, only fifteen named individuals.
51 Individuals were espe- cially likely to be named in health care matters where relief considerations made it important that orders apply to individuals (who could otherwise engage in the same conduct with a different entity).
52
Just as the Division's civil practice stands in sharp contrast to its criminal practice, the FTC's competition practice contrasts sharply with its fraud practice. The FTC routinely names individuals in federal fraud suits. 53 It regularly wins strong relief against several individuals per proceeding.
54
The Division policy of pursuing individuals 55 is sound; indeed, if anything, the Division should pursue more individuals more regularly. 56 If a corporation has engaged in sufficiently hard-core price fixing or market division to justify criminal condemnation, it would seem inevitable that one or more individuals in those corporations had, as well. That individual liability is essential flows logically from the same economics of deterrence that is at the source of much of the current debate.
It is now accepted that one can vary the level of penalty with the likelihood of being apprehended and punished. If an entity faces a ten percent chance of being caught, it is important that its prospective punishment be dramatically greater than the actual harm it imposes. This conclusion applies to entities and to individuals within entities.
Unfortunately, none of a corporation's usual array of employee punishments-denied promotions, demotions, discipline, and even terminationcomes anywhere near the proper level of punishment for serious, hard-core 53. According to its Annual Report, the FTC named individuals in 97% of the consumer cases it brought in fiscal 1996, for a total of 76 individuals named in 35 cases. See <http://www.ftc.gov/os/ar96/ append7a.htm#Consumer Redress>; see also Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d at 573 ("Once corporate liability is established, the FTC must show that the individual defendants participated directly in the practices or acts or had authority to control them. . . . The FTC must then demonstrate that the individual had some knowledge of the practices."); Gem Merchandising Corp covert price fixing of a substantial part of commerce. 57 Conceivably, in the extraordinary case, a corporation could fire an employee with such fanfare that other firms would ostracize him or her (thus inflicting a substantial loss of lifetime earnings), but such cases seem unusual in an age when candid evaluations are the exception and redemption continues to be in fashion.
Entities, in short, need the government to promise individual punishments so severe that price-fixing is deterred. Without the threat of a substantial penalty, a corporation's only alternative is to expend resources to increase the likelihood of detection (which may or may not be efficient). This alternative, which emphasizes monitoring, inspections, and the like, is costly to the corporation in real terms and seems likely to injure morale by sowing seeds of unnecessary distrust. 58 It also seems doomed to fail. Under current law, a corporation that discovers wrongdoing runs considerable risk in going public with that information, because it then could incur punishment through government or private challenges. 59 Employees may count on a corporation's hesitancy, figuring that severe punishment for price-fixing is quite unlikely since any such punishment likely would prompt the employee to make public the price-fixing. 60 Without the threat of individual liability, a corporation could not raise an employee's perceived chance of discovery sufficiently high to deter price-fixing, given the limited penalties the corporation can impose. The threat of individual liability also is important because employees are quite mobile today. A corporation can do little to a former employee.
The Division's preference for incarceration, as opposed to individual fines, also seems sensible. It seems highly unlikely that individual fines alone would 57. Firms also may face institutional constraints on their ability to choose an option that trades little monitoring for draconian penalties. It has been observed that firms expend surprising resources to detect employee theft and shirking, perhaps because an alternative use of very large penalties might adversely affect employee attitudes and performance, and a firm's public image. See William T. Dickens et al., Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle, 7 J. LABOR ECON. 331, 341 (1989) . The threat of a very large externally imposed penalty poses some, but not all, of these problems, because the decision to punish is external to the firm.
58. It has been suggested that employees would insist on compensation to reflect the expected value of any penalties they would incur. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 464 (5th ed. 1998). Even if true, this point does not detract from the point made in the text. At least where liability rules are clear, employees can attach an extremely low probability to the chance of paying any penalty at all, simply by intending to obey the law.
To offer an illustrative anecdote, a friend of mine who is the chief executive officer of a $400 million company tells me that training, supervision, monitoring, and review were nowhere near as effective in deterring speeding and illegal parking by company drivers as the simple institution of a policy that the individuals pay the fines. "[T]he role of private antitrust practitioners in counseling clients is made substantially easier if business executives recognize that the Antitrust Division has the will and capacity to identify and convict most price fixers. Even in nominal terms, fines since 1990 (when the maximum was raised) have ranged from a low of $37,580 in fiscal year 1994 to a high of $98,250 in fiscal year 1996. 62 Nor does it seem likely that were incarceration eliminated these numbers would go substantially higher, or at least not higher by the necessary order of magnitude. And, in any event, were the numbers raised sufficiently high, the great majority of individual defendants would be unable to pay. 63 Accordingly, individual criminal liability for hard-core price fixing seems warranted. 64 Indeed, it would seem desirable to make greater use of it by increasing the number of individual compared with corporate indictments. Now company officials may be unduly eager to sacrifice shareholder interests by settling civil cases without imposing individual liability in order to prevent friends and colleagues from paying a personal price. 65 It is important to shareholders in general that individual wrongdoers pay a substantial personal price, and this means that the Division must resist attempts by corporations to resolve cases without imposing such personal prices.
The FTC's frequent charging of individuals with fraud also represents sound general policy. Often, the corporations engaged in this activity are little more than vehicles for individuals to perpetrate schemes, and it makes sense to charge the real party. Where the individual who bears or shares principal responsibility for causing such serious harm can be identified, there is no reason not to proceed against him or her.
66
Given the comparative frequency with which the Division proceeds criminally against individuals believed to have engaged in naked cartel activities, and how commonly the FTC charges individuals with civil fraud, it is striking how 61. See Gallo et al., supra note 22. Relatively small individual fines are consistent with the Division's policy to prefer incarceration, so it is impossible to be sure what fines would result from a change in policy. 1982 dollars were used merely as a control year.
62. Calculated from ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD DATA FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS (Jan. 1997).
63. For the suggestion that inability to pay damages awards can partly explain the surprising (to some) lack of private litigation following-on government litigation, see Gregory L. Werden, PriceFixing and Civil Damages: Setting the Record Straight, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 307, 328-29 (1989) . Any suggestion that prison should be reserved for those who lack sufficient assets is a political non-starter that does not deserve serious discussion except as an interesting academic exercise.
64. See Blair, supra note 56, at 440-41 (also noting that imprisonment has the advantage of being incapable of being shifted to the firm).
65. Cf. Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick," supra note 12, at 448 n.165 (describing what were then known as "Westinghouse settlements" in which the corporation pleads guilty but charges are dropped against individuals).
66. The black letter law permits the FTC great discretion as to whom it should charge for a corporation's wrongs. My personal view is that the FTC should refrain from charging individuals with derivative liability unless it reasonably expects to be able to show responsibility in fact for the wrongs and the harms caused.
rarely the Division and the FTC's Bureau of Competition include charges against individuals in civil suits brought against entities.
B. Entity Liability
Largely for reasons canvassed in the literature, 67 the antitrust agencies appear on sensible ground in imposing responsibility for violations on entities. Such responsibility is the only alternative in that large part of the agencies' program where they do not charge individuals. The FTC's hard-core fraud program attacks entities organized to violate the law, so it would be odd to challenge selected individuals and not the entity itself.
Even for price-fixing, however, where individuals are indicted and sent to prison, it makes sense to proceed against the entity as well. As noted above, the Division currently indicts fewer than one person per indicted corporation. It seems unlikely that price-fixing is the responsibility entirely of solo rogue employees. Other individuals likely participated or assisted (if only by inattention), and entity liability is necessary if there is to be any hope of indirectly punishing them. The government proceeds only against individuals with great responsibility, where the evidence is clear-cut. Lesser wrongdoers also need punishment, and the government can and should work indirectly to cause them to be punished.
More generally, companies have the ability to try to influence if not entirely control the amount of price-fixing in which their employees engage, and it is important to provide a corporate incentive for firms to do so. Corporations can design compliance programs and consciously send the subtle, important signals that they take compliance seriously (even making compliance matters part of annual reviews and something factored into compensation decisions). The above discussion of individual criminal liability emphasized that the prospect of individual jail time is an essential component of a corporate compliance program. It is only part, however; corporate responsibility for price-fixing helps make sure that the message gets out.
The case for individual criminal liability flows easily from the above discussion, since incarceration is by definition criminal. Corporate criminal liability does not lead to incarceration, but merely to paying fines and perhaps corporate probation. Since the same dollars could be paid by the same company to the same U.S. Treasury, commentators have legitimately asked whether it makes any sense (and any difference) to collect the money criminally rather than civilly. They have pointed out that criminal enforcement can be more expensive and difficult and (by hypothesis) yields no greater payment. Other commentators have worried about the entire concept of criminal corporate liability, and have asked how a corporation really can have the mens rea that we require for criminal liability. One simple response to these arguments, for purposes of the antitrust laws, is that Congress has provided for criminal corporate liability and not for civil liability. The Antitrust Division can punish corporations criminally. 69 Given the Division's apparently well-founded belief that international cartels are of increasing concern, 70 it is hard to fault their view that they should use the tools Congress had provided to them.
Another response is to doubt that, as some have suggested, a civil fine has the same deterrent effect as a criminal fine. 71 The stock-market studies of this issue are inconclusive. 72 My discussions with officers and lawyers for a series of substantial companies, however, are decidedly one-sided: Criminal is different. 73 As one CEO told me, if his company pays a moderate civil fine, it is five minutes at a regular board of director's meeting; were that same fine a felony, there is a special board meeting. One CEO worried about customers that would rather not purchase from a tainted source; an inside counsel worried about recruiting new employees; another inside counsel worried about the effect on existing employees.
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The persons with whom I talked disagreed so strongly with the suggestion that criminal and civil fines are equivalent that I am loath to assume that they are, absent some clear supporting evidence. 74. This last counsel also speculated that the Wall Street Journal would cover a criminal conviction or plea more prominently than a civil fine. I share that speculation. This may be a testable hypothesis (and may have been tested, although it is very hard to isolate out the criminal label from the rest of the package).
75. If criminal fines are, by definition, more punitive than equal civil fines, then that would be reason enough for the Division to oppose conversion of historically criminal antitrust fines to civil fines. Gallo and his colleagues have carefully compared actual and optimal antitrust fines, and concluded that actual fines fall woefully short of the ideal. More specifically, Gallo computed that fines imposed between 1955 and 1993 represented barely more than four-tenths of one percent of optimal fines. 76 Subsequent research has found that firms were easily capable of paying dramatically larger fines, such that the actual fines paid and even the maximum fines permitted by the statute may not deter price-fixing behavior. 77 Even substantially increasing maximum criminal corporate fines, as the Division has requested, will not raise them to a level where the Division is likely to conclude that equal civil fines would provide sufficient deterrence.
Apart from pure deterrence, the Division likely remains loyal to criminal fines because it views the Sherman Act's long-time status as a criminal statute as an important expression of societal norms. Law Professor John C. Coffee has reminded us that criminal laws communicate beliefs and values.
78 Plus, the Antitrust Division has a long history of emphasizing that price fixing is a crime. Even if it were more sensible to have proceeded with civil corporate sanctions at one time, it would send a troubling message to de-criminalize price-fixing now. Conceivably one could retain criminal individual liability while moving to civil corporate liability, but politicians are not likely to want to appear to be favoring companies over individuals. Thus, there seems little chance that corporate price fixing will be de-criminalized, and-at least at currently contemplated levels of fines-keeping the status quo seems sound.
B. Carrots
The current structure of penalties offers two different and important "carrots" for corporate compliance. First, the Division has a widely touted amnesty program for the first person to report a conspiracy. 79 Second, the Sen-ACAD. MGMT. J. 129, 146 (1997) (although short-term consequences are indeterminate, a sample of firms found liable for serious wrongdoing showed consistently poorer long-term performance than a control group; the authors speculated that such a finding "may stain a firm's image, sending a warning signal to stakeholders, or prompt stakeholders to reassess relationships with the firm"). 80 The Division has been quite emphatic about its opposition to considering corporate compliance activities as part of the determination of liability, 81 and rightly so. Indeed, the case for substantially reducing corporate penalties for an "effective" compliance program that happened to have failed seems less than overwhelming.
See Joseph C. Gallo et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study in Law and
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In a market economy, society usually provides incentives and then relies on market participants to seek out the most efficient response. A generation of economists have shown that incentives are superior to commands and controls, 83 yet somehow this learning has been ignored. The results are all too predictable.
A company has a wide array of ways to increase its compliance with various laws. It can emphasize the quality of its people, by hiring honest employees, encouraging them to live healthy lives, and taking care of them in time of need. It can create good incentives, by tying compensation to long-term results, by refraining from exerting undue pressure, and by paying supra-competitive wages employees will not want to risk losing. It can teach and remind. It can monitor and audit. And it can threaten with whatever draconian consequences are in its power (including, perhaps, turning employees over to government law enforcers). Some companies will be better at one approach, some at another, most at some mix; but it would be surprising were the same approach right for all. Accordingly, it would seem self-evident that government should set out penalties for violating the law and leave it to firms to determine how best to respond to those penalties. 84 That is not the approach of the Sentencing Guide- (Feb. 20, 1992) , available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches> ("executives too often fail to understand that the true benefit of a compliance program in fact is to prevent the commission of antitrust crimes, and not simply to avoid being prosecuted for them"); Spratling, The Experience and Views of the Antitrust Division, supra note 79.
82. The Division was criticized in connection with the ADM settlement for not insisting on a court-supervised compliance program. This failure allegedly meant that the "Division gave up the opportunity to make a significant statement about the need for antitrust compliance programs." Gregory J. Wallance lines, which have emphasized government-designed compliance programs. Inevitably, the quixotic effort to define the good yet unsuccessful compliance program has stumbled. Some want further to define good programs. 85 Others worry that potential liability may prevent the auditing and monitoring that is part of a good program, thus they urge the creation of immunities to encourage a good program. My own inclination is to resist the campaign to reward unsuccessful programs that meet externally-created standards.
Mine is only an inclination, however, and not a firm conclusion. Two arguments favoring a "carrot" approach give me pause. The first is the suggestion that corporate mens rea should not be considered proven, for criminal liability, if the corporation as an institution has taken sufficiently strong (albeit unsuccessful) steps to attempt to comply with the law. 86 This is a troubling proposition. It is a creature solely of criminalization of corporate liability. Corporate criminality might be justified on operationalist grounds (it's effective) or as sending a signal about society's values, but much of corporate criminal liability is about liability based exclusively on a wrongful act, without regard to what individuals subjectively intended. Rewarding good faith but unsuccessful efforts to comply with the law in part appeals to those with underlying concern about corporate criminality, 87 but it undermines some of the bright-line benefits of making certain actions criminal for a corporation.
The other argument that gives pause is the sophisticated attempt by Arlen and Kraakman to show that only a composite approach, with a mix of strict liability penalties and conduct-oriented incentives, can achieve the optimal level of deterrence. They begin with the twin premises that strict liability often will provide correct incentives but that strict liability may have the perverse effect of discouraging policing. The solution to this dilemma, they conclude, will often be a "composite liability" scheme that separately punishes an entity's wrongdoing and its "failure to discharge its policing duties." 88 Arlen and Kraakman erect an impressive theoretical structure, but they slide too easily over a weakness in their structure's foundation. That weakness is that a legal system can punish failures to police (or, which is the same thing, reward policing) only very imperfectly. Arlen and Kraakman acknowledge that our ability to reward policing is an issue, 89 but in the end they assume rather than prove The ability of duty-based liability regimes to regulate firms' policing measures thus depends largely on how competently lawmakers and judges can articulate and assess the optimal that courts can, for instance, determine whether a firm "performs all of its policing duties optimally." 90 In my view, they underestimate the difficulty of designing and then shoe-horning companies into approved compliance models, and of distinguishing genuinely effective (although unsuccessful) programs from ones that merely appear to be effective. Rewards for an approved policing program may create their own suboptimal incentives if it would otherwise be more efficient for a firm to deter crime by hiring carefully, adjusting compensation incentives, establishing a culture of compliance, or increasing penalties for non-compliance, for instance. Rewarding approved policing would lessen otherwise prospective punishments for law violations, and I doubt that the tradeoff is often worth it.
V THE ROLE OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
In an earlier paper, I identified and reviewed three potentially positive roles for civil antitrust class actions: supplemental deterrence, compensation, and identification of wrongdoing. 91 Those roles are potentially more important for private litigation, as is discussed below. Private litigation contributes in other ways that are worthy of attention. In particular, private litigation is important to the evolution of legal doctrine, to provide a safety valve, and to contribute to protecting the actual and perceived integrity of the antitrust system.
92
A. Supplemental Deterrence Private antitrust enforcement was once viewed as essential to the punishing of wrongful behavior identified by an antitrust agency. The antitrust agencies lacked meaningful ability to punish, so without follow-on private litigation there could be no significant punishment.
93
Increased federal penalties for criminal antitrust violations obviously reduce the importance of deterrence through follow-on litigation. As noted earlier, 94 The increase in federal criminal penalties has not eliminated the need for supplemental deterrence of hard core price fixing, at least. (The jury is still out on consumer fraud. 96 ) Until very recently, government penalties for pricefixing were so far removed from optimal levels that they could not be considered an effective deterrent at all. 97 That has changed, yet optimal levels for price-fixing may be sufficiently high that there is little risk that penalties will achieve that level. The Division's current push to ratchet penalties up by another factor of ten 98 is an implicit recognition that its current authority to penalize cannot result in the efficient imposition of adequate fines. Historically, antitrust courts have imposed little in the way of penalties; 99 so one cannot be confident, even with new legislation, what the pattern of penalization will be in the future.
One special role for private antitrust, however, is the imposing of adverse consequences on persons who engage in misconduct falling short of being criminal or fraudulent. The Antitrust Division and the FTC regularly file civil challenges alleging conduct that appears fairly clearly illegal. These are civil cases, however, and the agencies almost never seek or obtain anything more than a prospective order to end and prevent recurrence of the challenged conduct. Nonpunitive prospective relief orders are not designed to deter misconduct.
Two recent Justice Department consent decrees illustrate the situation.
United States v. Tom Paige Catering Co.
100 concluded a singularly offensive episode (if the allegations are true). The only two bidders on the meal contract offered by the Cleveland Head Start program, 1992-94, ended their competition by forming a "joint venture."
101 Prices increased; cold lunches that cost $1.01 in 1993 cost sixty-eight percent more in late 1994, when competition had ended.
102
In spite of this sorry tale, the Division agreed to settle the matter for merely an injunction assuring future competition. 103 Similarly, when IBM and StorateTek allegedly contractually eliminated competition between them over the multibillion-dollar disk-storage subsystems for mainframe computers, thus slowing the previously rapid decline in prices, the Division settled the matters for a consent order that may or may not restore 102. Id. 103. Id. at 67,900-901 (effect of proposed judgment on competition). Although Tom Paige is a good example of a case of clear wrongdoing that may go unpunished, it may not be an example specifically of the potential for private litigation to supplement civil governmental enforcement. It appears that the victim in Tom Paige was the government itself. Perhaps the government refrained from seeking the treble damages to which it was entitled, 15 U.S.C. § 145a (1994), because of the small size of the conspiracy. Cf. 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,899 (annual value of contracts was between $300,000 and $500,000).
competition.
104
The Division considered seeking damages on governmental purchases, but elected not to because further litigation would delay ending the anticompetitive agreements.
105
The FTC also regularly challenges conduct apparently violative of the core of antitrust. In each of the past two years, the FTC found that certain horizontal restraints among trade associations were illegal per se. The FTC condemned the California Dentist's Association for banning truthful price advertising and the International Society of Conference Interpreters for limiting price competition. 106 Earlier, the FTC prevailed in important cases challenging horizontal restrictions by Indiana dentists 107 and Detroit auto dealers. 108 In each instance, the FTC entered only prospective relief (usually ordering an end to the challenged conduct).
The FTC also challenges without punishing fairly clearly illegal conduct as part of its consumer protection mission. The most recent example concerns the advertising of premium gasoline, which, despite its substantially greater cost, is of little benefit to most engines. 109 In 1992, the FTC filed a complaint and accompanying consent order that challenged Sun Company's allegedly unsupported claims that its high-octane gasolines "provide superior engine power and acceleration."
110 Two years later, the agency filed a complaint and accompanying consent order that challenged Unocal Corporation's allegedly unsupported claims that its high-octane gasoline "provides superior engine performance and longevity."
111 Another two years later, the agency filed a complaint 110. Sun Co., 115 F.T.C. 560, 561 (1992). Commissioner Owen dissented because she viewed the remedy as insufficient. Id. at 569. As Commissioner Owen noted 20 years earlier, the FTC had condemned Sun Co. for misrepresenting the benefits of what it then described as its "custom blended" gasoline, which purportedly meant that all of its gasoline were unusual because they were "blended with action of Sunoco 260, the highest octane gasoline at any station, anywhere." Sun Oil Co., 84 F.T.C. 247, 249 (1974) (complaint paragraph 10A). After trial, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order barring certain misrepresentations, which was not appealed by Sun and became final. The ALJ rejected complaint counsel's request for corrective advertising because, given the energy crisis then being endured, he found that "it is not likely that power and high octane ratings will be advertised in the near future." Id. at 279.
111. Unocal Corp., 117 F.T.C. 500, 503 (1994 12, 1997 ). The proposed Exxon order is somewhat narrower than the orders previously entered, but Exxon would be ordered to run a 15-second "consumer education" commercial about octane and to distribute a specified brochure on the subject. From Unocal Corporation (1994): 1. With the high cost of falling in love these days you can't trust your investment to just any gasoline. That's why Seventy-Six developed our Ninety-two Unleaded. It's the highest level octane you can buy to help your car run better, longer. Because after all isn't love supposed to last forever? . . . 3. . . . Unocal's 89 unleaded is two octanes higher than regular unleaded to keep your car running better, longer. . . . Compared to regular unleaded, our 89 octane will give your car smoother starts and stops, help reduce engine knocks and pings. 117 F.T.C. at 50102.
From Amoco Oil Co. (1996): Amoco Ultimate is the only premium refined an extra step to remove harmful impurities other premiums leave in. Impurities that can rob your engine of performance and pollute the air.. . .
It's your car. Your baby. Your one and only. Everything about it has to be as good as gold. And when you're running on Amoco Ultimate, you're running clean. Amoco Ultimate is refined an extra step for quality. . It appears almost as though the FTC's complaints and orders provided creative inspiration instead of sobering deterrence. Given the similarity of these advertising campaigns, it is clear that the threat of an FTC investigation and lawsuit provided relatively little deterrence, compared with the prospective gains from the proposed commercials. 116 It is also clear that the prospect of Lanham Act litigation, 117 which one competitor can bring against another, was of little deterrence. Although optimal deterrence is difficult to measure, it seems unlikely that the FTC provided the socially optimal level of deterrence of exaggerated advertising of premium gasoline, an expensive product of little value to most consumers.
118
When government agencies challenge conduct that appears to be clearly illegal, and yet the only punishment (other than the cost and inconvenience of litigating) is living with a prospective nonpunitive order, then private litigation has a deterrence role to play. 119 The Antitrust Division's civil program, and the FTC's competitive and nonfraud-based consumer protection programs, challenge without punishing what the agencies see as misconduct. Questionable proposed mergers are a (very large) special category: Deterrence is not an issue because so many mergers are procompetitive and questionable mergers are almost always disclosed to the agencies for advance review. Some other challenged conduct is borderline (and some may be lawful, and wrongly challenged), but other challenged activity is sufficiently wrong that it merits deterrence. Under the current approach of federal enforcers, private litigation is the only available source of deterrence. Whether or not Peltzman was (and continues to be) right, it is obvious that the FTC does not deter all misleading advertising (nor would society want such a high level of deterrence), and the experience with premium gasoline suggests that even a fairly clear risk of FTC action does not deter clearly misleading ads likely to contribute significantly to profits. Additional deterrence seems warranted, albeit on impressions rather than hard empiricism.
119. Federal enforcement also can be supplemented by state action. For instance, last fall, an FTC administrative law judge found that Toys 'R' Us had violated the FTC Act. See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9278 (F.T.C. Sept. 30, 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9709/toysrus.pdf> (initial decision). Within days of the decision, the state of New York filed a suit against the firm, thus joining class actions filed in three federal courts. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Toys 'R' Us Could Become Suits 'R' Us, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at B1. Any lack of punitive provisions in the judge's order could be offset by the related litigation. (Of course, if the FTC's suit is unmerited, or if the challenged conduct should be changed but not punished, the related litigation imposes additional unfortunate costs.)
B. Compensation
Compensation becomes a more important feature of private antitrust litigation once one expands beyond class actions. Antitrust plaintiffs continue to win (or achieve through settlement) substantial, hard-money recoveries. 120 If deserved, recoveries are particularly valuable since they compensate for harms that are probably not insurable.
Whether these recoveries are always deserved is another matter. Commentators regularly have worried about the abuse of antitrust litigation, particularly by competitor plaintiffs. 121 Antitrust courts have responded with procedural and substantive decisions that facilitate the early disposition of unmeritorious cases, 122 but worries remain. 123 What remains uncontroverted is that plaintiffs do win substantial recoveries and thus earn compensation for real or perceived injuries.
C. Identification of Wrongdoing
My earlier paper 124 explained that class actions, rather than just following behind government efforts, have helped initiate the challenging of questionable activities. For instance, the massive NASDAQ, 125 Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 126 and Insurance Antitrust Litigation 127 proceedings all had origins in class actions separate from federal antitrust initiatives. Any suggestion that class actions merely follow where the federal government has led 128 cannot withstand the evidence of current practice.
When one considers private actions more generally, and not just class actions, the role of private antitrust in identifying alleged wrongdoing is even more pronounced. Eighty percent or more of antitrust cases do not follow on government actions. 129 The heart of antitrust continues to be private litiga-tion. 130 Unless those cases are unmeritorious, there are far more antitrust wrongs than federal enforcers are funded to handle.
D. Evolution of Legal Doctrine
Private antitrust litigation has been essential to the development of modern antitrust doctrine. This contribution of private antitrust is fairly recent, and it is sometimes unappreciated. 131 As a small, unscientific experiment, I took the newest antitrust law school casebook 132 and examined the sixty principal cases. Of the thirty-seven issued before 1977 (the watershed year of Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 133 ), only seven, or nineteen percent, were private suits. Of the twenty-three opinions issued starting that year, seventeen, or seventy-six percent, were private suits-and that figure does not 143 are almost entirely private cases. An-titrust law is, in large part, law crafted through private litigation. The field is richer, and counselors can give advice with more precision and confidence, because of the existence of private-litigation-generated case law. Those areas of antitrust that have been the subject of substantial litigation have achieved notably more certainty and predictability.
144
To be sure, nothing prevents the antitrust agencies from litigating more cases and contributing more to the judicial development of the law. Assistant Attorney General Klein has spoken of the importance of litigating cases and developing doctrine in the courts, 145 so the Division may bring more cases. The FTC has streamlined its adjudicative rules so as to facilitate the efficient adjudication of disputes.
146 Yet the agencies thus far have litigated few civil nonmerger cases, and this seems unlikely to change dramatically. During the past seven fiscal years, the FTC has filed a total of only eight administrative competition complaints (merger and non-merger).
147
Between 1980 and 1996, the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter shows a total of only ten civil Antitrust Division cases (merger or non-merger).
148 Between fiscal years 1981 and 1997, the Division filed a total of only eight Sherman Act section 2 cases, and six of those cases were filed in the last six years. In only three of the past ten fiscal years did the Division file more than three Sherman Act civil section 1 cases. In the other years, the Division averaged only 1.7 complaints a year.
149
Government antitrust litigation is unlikely to increase dramatically, for many of the same reasons that it has declined. Those reasons include the fearfully high cost of litigation and the interest in preserving benign aspects of proposed transactions. 150 Even if the antitrust agencies do consider the "positive externality" of law development when computing the costs and benefits of pro-144. See generally Calkins, supra note 91. The antitrust agencies have contributed greatly to the development of antitrust theory and doctrine through the use of guidelines, reports, speeches, and consent orders (although consent orders are tea leaves requiring considerable interpretation). The leading two-volume antitrust text includes excerpts from four statutes covering 40 pages, see ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 1357-1406, and from seven sets of guidelines covering 223 pages, id. at 1407-1623. In recent years, the antitrust agencies have enhanced access to these materials by making them available on agency internet home pages. 147. The last fiscal year in which more than two such complaints were filed was 1990, with five complaints. These figures exclude court complaints, in which the FTC has sought a preliminary injunction against a merger, but they include the companion administrative complaints challenging those mergers. Complaints of matters that were not litigated to a conclusion also are included.
148 spective litigation (as they should), 151 it seems unlikely that government litigation can increase sufficiently to displace the law-development role of private cases.
E. Safety Valve
Private antitrust also plays a special role as something of a safety-valve.
Persons injured by what they reasonably believe to be illegal conduct can have their day in court. Assuming that the law is reasonably clear-and private litigation has contributed substantially to clarifying the law-it can be invoked by big firms and little alike.
The alternative would be to rely on government enforcers. This is not a realistic alternative for the foreseeable future because of resource constraints. Beyond that, it is healthy that firms unable to interest a government agency in their cause can, if they deem the cause sufficiently important, proceed to a tribunal. That option also contributes to the healthy functioning of the antitrust system, for reasons that follow.
F. The Integrity of the Antitrust System
Antitrust has become a form of economic regulation. "The Regulatory Character of Modern Antitrust Policy" was the topic for one of the January 1998 programs sponsored by the antitrust and economic regulation section of the Association of American Law Schools. As has been chronicled elsewhere, the antitrust agencies have left their gun-slinging, "we're just law enforcers," image behind. 153 This has important consequences for private litigation. It was almost inevitable that government antitrust became more regulatory, beginning in 1976 when the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was passed. Between fiscal years 1992 and 1997, the number of mergers reported to the agencies more than doubled, from 1,589 to 3,702.
154 Some of these mergers-such as the telecommunications transactions investigated by the Antitrust Division, and the Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas mergers investigated by the FTC-are extraordinarily complex. Evaluating them is a massive undertaking.
155
Where possible, the antitrust agencies seek to preserve the procompetitive or benign parts of proposed transactions. 156 The agencies recognize that mergers can generate efficiencies and enhance competition. 157 Yet litigation is costly and uncertain, and the courtroom is a poor place to practice the kind of detailed surgery needed to excise objectionable parts of proposed mergers. Similarly, the antitrust agencies have shown considerable interest in permitting the unobjectionable aspects of coordination among competitors to continue.
158
In a wide variety of situations, agencies can accomplish more by negotiation than confrontation.
159
The antitrust agencies and the antitrust system nonetheless pay an inevitable price for becoming more regulatory. The "I'm a law enforcer" shield was a , 1997 ), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9712/shell.htm>, in return for some divestitures (which is normal) and entry of a highly regulatory 10-year supply agreement (which is not). The FTC's analysis to aid public comment argues that the joint venture would permit the new interest to control a heated pipeline near San Francisco, the source of crude oil for that pipeline, and substantial part of the capacity to receive that oil and make asphalt for Northern California, which would harm competition by disadvantaging the only other substantial Northern California asphalt supplier (which buys crude oil transported through that pipeline). The FTC states that the consent order "eliminates this risk" through a 10-year supply agreement at prices approved by the FTC. It seems more likely, however, that the consent order would prevent price increases for ten years. Presumably, the FTC decided to sacrifice competition in subsequent years in exchange for efficiency gains from the venture. (Since the FTC is not explicit about this trade-off, we cannot know whether the efficiency gains were in this market or some other market.)
157. (Feb. 26, 1998) , available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/testimony/1581.htm> ("The majority of mergers do not threaten to harm competition and consumers; often, they can increase efficiency, improve research and development, and lower prices to consumers. Because of these benefits, even when we do have reason to believe a merger as proposed may be anticompetitive, we look for a way to prevent the anticompetitive aspects of the merger from going forward, while not prohibiting parts of the deal that do not raise anticompetitive concerns.").
159. Why can't each of us write . . . a letter to Reno . . . that sums up our sense of the facts involved in Microsoft's monopoly, our appraisal of its costs, and our concerns as to what it means for the future of the industry and the country? . . . Why can't we, at a minimum, write her a note with an attachment-the attachment being what we consider the two or three more best posts to this list?
You bet she'll read them. And, bureaucracy being what it is, she'll pass them down to Joel Klein and his 300 lawyers and economists in the Antitrust Division with a note suggesting rather strongly that they, too, read them.
The last time I checked this list had only 270 members. A dozen good letters could have a profound effect at Justice. E-mail from Charles Mueller to <antitrust@essential.org> (Nov. 11, 1997) (on file with author). Microsoft spokesman Mark Murray has complained about the current lobbying: "It's absolutely clear Pressure is brought to bear on the Antitrust Division and the FTC both directly and indirectly, by lobbying Congress. Butterworth and Blodgett hospitals managed to persuade the Senate that it should deny the FTC funding for an adjudication the hospitals were not sure they could win. 165 Before the full Congress could act, the FTC saved them the trouble by dismissing the adjudicative complaint. 166 When the FTC was adjudicating a claim that New Balance was claiming its shoes were "made in America" without meeting the traditional "all or virtually all" test, New Balance responded by protesting to the New England congressional delegation, which even asked chairman designate Robert Pitofsky about the issue during his confirmation hearings. 167 The FTC stayed the proceedings and scheduled public workshops to consider whether to fashion a new standard, more appropriate for an increasingly independent world economy. 168 The FTC withdrew its complaint against New Balance in exchange for what a dissenting commissioner attacked as an "eviscerated" order, 169 and the FTC proposed a new, more permissive standard. 170 Then the public, labor unions, and members of Congress protested the proposed new standard, and the FTC abandoned it. 171 The unhappy lesson suggested by incidents such as these is that political influence is a necessary tool in the arsenal of weapons employed by antitrust and trade regulation lawyers. This is not to suggest that politics is all that matters, or that it is important even in many cases. The observation is merely that, with the increasingly regulatory nature of antitrust and trade regulation, observers perceive that politics is commensurately increasing in importance.
Private litigation is a valuable antidote to concerns arising from the increasingly regulatory nature of antitrust and trade regulation. Private litigation contributes strongly to the certainty and predictability of antitrust law. Time and again we have seen courts be unwilling to allow a perceived treble damage windfall to turn on some vague admonition. 172 Standards of conduct that would be acceptable in Europe, where a single agency can exercise prosecutorial discretion, would be unimaginable here. Private antitrust contributes to the existence of clear signals, which, in turn, minimize charges that antitrust enforcement is unduly political.
173
Private antitrust also makes possible the extremely healthy response that, if someone objects to a firm's conduct and cannot interest the government, the party often can file suit individually. Were an antitrust agency ever to be captured by the special interests so widely discussed in the media, and were the agency wrongfully to refrain from proceeding against a favored firm, others could step in. It is liberating to be able to say to someone asking for enforcement action that the agency does not see a law violation but the petitioner is free to proceed alone if it desires. The very existence of private litigation alternatives likely lessens the frequency with which charges of influence arise. Private litigation thus helps preserve the actual and perceived integrity of the antitrust system.
VI POSSIBLE MODEST IMPROVEMENTS
The above review covers a series of big issues that could call for big responses. Some would urge ending corporate criminal liability, some would urge increasing carrots. The suggestions I make are more modest. They are set forth and applied with respect to antitrust and trade regulation, but may also have more general application.
A. Recognize the External Benefits of Litigation
The antitrust agencies, private litigants, and the antitrust system all benefit when the agencies can and do litigate. Litigation, and its preservation as a vi-172. Many of the cases mentioned above as contributing to the evolution of antitrust doctrine reflect the search for increasingly objective standards.
173. The converse is also true, of course. Private causes of action interfere with evolution of law through non-enforcement. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 660 (5th ed. 1998) (public monopoly of enforcement makes possible the prosecutorial nullification of laws or particular applications thereof). Dean Sullivan presciently described the increase in power for regulatory enforcers to shape antitrust law by non-enforcement. See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1986) . At least until the past decade or so, the American antitrust enforcement system had opted in general for clarity and evolution through the judiciary. able alternative to settlement or dismissal, keeps enforcers and defendants honest and fair. Litigation establishes universally enforceable standards. And litigation preserves the capability of litigating, which is essential for the system to function effectively.
Litigation thus yields benefits far in excess of any improved outcome in a particular case. Although no agency should litigate an unmeritorious case, or litigate without hope of an improved outcome, the cost-benefit analysis employed to decide whether to expend resources litigating should recognize not just the potential benefit in the case at issue, but also the externality benefit to the system as a whole.
Both antitrust agencies should factor in this externality benefit. In addition, the FTC, which can adjudicate its own cases, should continue its work making administrative adjudication a viable alternative to the federal courts. 174 At the same time, the agencies need to continue monitoring judicial developments in private cases, and participate where they can contribute to improvements in the law.
B. Develop Noncriminal Sanctions for Law Violations
The agencies' bi-modal approach to sanctions is unfortunate, for the variety of reasons discussed above. Expansion of "middle ground" deterrence would be of significant benefit.
Despite the FTC's now-common use of its authority to win consumer redress and other equitable relief, 176 there is surprisingly little established, helpful wisdom about when such remedies are permitted and appropriate. The hallmarks of a "proper case," for which a permanent injunction and/or other ancillary relief may be sought, remain "ill-defined." 177 The many cases in which the FTC has achieved consumer redress are typified by the apparent existence of serious consumer fraud, 178 but this does not appear to be a legal limitation, n proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction."). Section 19(b), which authorized a federal court follow-on to a FTC proceeding that condemned an act or practice that "a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent," offers a somewhat clearer standard, see supra note 32, but the FTC rarely brings litigated Section 19(b) cases.
178. Cf. Paul, supra note 32, at 145 (FTC's General Counsel lauded increased use of Section 13(b) as "the most efficacious way to obtain quick and effective relief for, at a minimum, hard core unfair and deceptive practices.").
179. The principal legislative history describes only when the FTC can seek a permanent injunction (without discussing redress or other equitable relief), and it is not a model of clarity even on that issue:
Provision is also made in section 210 for the Commission to seek and, after a hearing, for a court to grant a permanent injunction. This will allow the Commission to seek a permanent injunction when a court is reluctant to grant a temporary injunction because it cannot be assured of a [sic] early hearing on the merits. Since a permanent injunction could only be granted after such a hearing, this will assure the court of the ability to set a definite hearing and, even if it were, "fraud" is an ill-defined term. 180 So, any fraud limitation may be more a matter of FTC restraint than statutory language or judgecrafted doctrine. The FTC could increase deterrence and enhance the rule of law were it to enunciate some standards for seeking redress or other ancillary relief, and then litigate those standards until they achieve judicial acceptance or rejection. Deterrence can be achieved only when persons expect consequences.
The FTC's experience with redress is limited almost entirely to consumer protection cases, but there are a few exceptions. The FTC first achieved consumer redress in an antitrust case in 1980, when crayon manufacturers accused of coordinating prices agreed to pay $1.2 million in restitution for expected use by public school systems. 181 Although FTC Director of the Bureau of Competition Alfred Dougherty opined that "the agreements are significant because they reflect the importance of including consumer redress in the [FTC]'s antitrust arsenal," 182 the FTC has rarely visited that part of its arsenal. The FTC's competition cases. It also would reassure observers that the FTC is choosing between monetary penalties and other alternatives based on firm principles and not just litigation exigencies. Development of FTC-imposed monetary consequences for anticompetitive acts seems eminently desirable, and might give the FTC a comparative advantage over the Antitrust Division in challenging non-criminal anticompetitive acts. 190 It is less obvious how, without legislation, the Division should begin constructing "middle ground" deterrence. Perhaps the Division should follow the FTC's lead by seeking to obtain consumer redress as ancillary relief to permanent injunctions. Alternatively, perhaps the Division should, at some point in a civil proceeding against a clear violation, consider referring the matter to the FTC.
Development of civil government-initiated consequences for antitrust violations might have benefits beyond deterrence. It could lay the groundwork for making practicable a rethinking of the use of corporate criminal antitrust penalties. At present, criminal penalties are the only viable deterrent. Until the use of civil penalties is expanded, debates about reducing criminal penalties 191 will be exclusively academic.
C. Continue to Emphasize Individual Liability
As a matter of theory and fact, penalizing individuals is singularly effective. Further, criminal individual liability carries with it none of the awkwardness of corporate criminality. Good things follow when individuals need to worry that fixing prices may make them a felon, and that playing a leading role in causing fraud may have serious personal consequences. 192 Insisting on individual liability is not always easy. Many corporations resist "sacrificing" high-ranking individuals. Companies may be more willing to inflict a comparatively trivial financial penalty on every shareholder (most of whom are anonymous) than a massive punishment on one particular individual, especially if that individual is a long-valued and appreciated leader. Conversely, government agencies that wage annual appropriations fights may suspect that their budget woes are more likely to be eased through huge corporate fines 193 than through imprisonment or much smaller individual fines. The Antitrust Division, which has consistently emphasized the importance of individual criminal liability and has indicted about as many individuals as corporations, 194 should be commended for proceeding in litigation against individuals involved in the Archer Daniels Midland matter, 195 and it should be encouraged to maintain and improve its commitment to indict individuals. It would be unfortunate were the Division's desire to reach more substantial firms to lead it to relax its commitment to reach more than merely the firms. Similarly, the FTC should continue to seek remedies against the individuals who play leading roles in causing serious consumer fraud. 196 
D. Coordinate Sanctions
From a deterrence perspective, it make no difference whether payments are made to the U.S. Treasury, states, or consumers. 197 It is unfortunate that the Sentencing Guidelines failed to recognize this and do not permit coordination of penalties. 198 Given that federal and state enforcers are increasingly allied, 199 the only sensible course is to seek to coordinate penalties. The obvious benefits of coordinating penalties have not gone unrecognized. The Antitrust Division conditions its grant of corporate leniency on, among other things, a corporation's making "restitution to injured parties" where possible. 200 The Division thus seeks to ensure that a corporation cannot confess to wrongdoing while retaining the fruits thereof. Conversely, it is when remedial action by private parties of state attorneys general is not likely to be forthcoming that FTC antitrust restitution is most appropriate, in the view of FTC Chairman Steiger. 201 The FTC took an important step toward increased coordination of penalties in Blue Coral, Inc. 202 The agreement that tentatively resolved this false advertising case expressly reserved to the FTC the right to seek consumer redress, without respect to any usual statutes of limitation, if the respondents did not make available consumer redress with a retail value of at least $10 million pursuant to class action lawsuits challenging the questioned advertising. 203 The FTC also reserved the right to intervene in any such class action lawsuit to oppose a proposed settlement that the FTC "does not deem to be in the public interest" (with the important exception that the FTC may not object to the amount of any settlement for which the "aggregate retail value" is at least $10 million). 204 The FTC's resolution of this dispute thus allowed the agency to play an important role in identifying and ending misleading advertising, while letting private litigants take the lead in extracting compensation and, in theory, imposing penalties on the wrongdoers, with the FTC standing by in case the private litigation failed to accomplish this objective. 205 There will be times when private or state attorney general litigation may be a superior vehicle for aiding persons injured by illegal activity; 206 there will be times when the efficient course is entirely federal. The important thing is that there be sufficient (but not excessive) total deterrence. 207 
